Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic in economics, engineering, and machine learning. An important concept in credit assignment is the core, which is the set of stable allocations where no agent has the motivation to deviate from the grand coalition. In this paper, we consider the stable allocation learning problem of stochastic cooperative games, where the reward function is characterised as a random variable with an unknown distribution. Given an oracle that returns a stochastic reward for an enquired coalition each round, our goal is to learn the expected core, that is, the set of allocations that are stable in expectation. Within the class of strictly convex games, we present an algorithm named \texttt{Common-Points-Picking} that returns a stable allocation given a polynomial number of samples, with high probability. The analysis of our algorithm involves the development of several new results in convex geometry, including an extension of the separation hyperplane theorem for multiple convex sets, and may be of independent interest.
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